The Cyprus conflict: Will it ever end in agreement?

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The Cyprus Conflict

Will It Ever End in Agreement?

RAYMOND SANER

The goal of this chapter is to describe factors that have contributed to the persistent failures of peace negotiations on Cyprus. Although there are several causes of this protracted deadlock, such as identity issues (see P. Terrence Hopmann's chapter, "Issue Content and Incomplete Negotiations"), and the power issue for the two communities, this chapter attempts to delineate an essential impact that multiple and competing external stakeholders (influential foreign powers, supranational institutions, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs from various countries) have had on the peace process. Then, to show how these third parties (first level Greece and Turkey; secondary level United States, UK, EU, and UN) have used the Cyprus conflict for their own strategic aims and secondary gains by offering their influence to the two conflict parties (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots). As a result of these ongoing external stakeholder interferences, the Cyprus conflict has persisted and the negotiation behavior of the primary conflict parties became characterized by opportunistic tactical maneuvers that have prolonged and deepened non-agreement ever since the peace-enforcing presence of UN forces on the island started in 1974 and has lasted up to the writing of this chapter.

THE CYPRUS CONFLICT 2002–JANUARY 2006

In January 2002, direct talks under the auspices of UN secretary-general Kofi Annan began between Republic of Cyprus president Glafcos Clerides (Greek community) and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash.[1] In November 2002, Annan released a comprehensive plan for the resolution of the Cyprus issue, which was revised in early December. In the lead-up to the European Union's December 2002 Copenhagen Summit, intensive efforts were made to gain signatures of both sides to the document prior to a decision on the island's EU membership. Neither side agreed to sign. The EU invited the Republic of Cyprus to join on December 16, 2002.

Following the Copenhagen Summit, the UN continued dialogue with the two sides with the goal of reaching a settlement prior to Cyprus's signing of the EU accession treaty on April 16, 2003, and a third version of the Annan plan was put to the parties in February 2003. That same month the secretary-general again visited the island and asked that both leaders agree to put the plan to referendum in their respective communities. Also in February 2003, Tassos Papadopoulos was elected as the fifth president of the Republic of Cyprus. On March 10, 2003, this most recent phase of talks collapsed in The Hague, Netherlands, when Denktash told the secretary-general he would not put the Annan plan to referendum.

In February 2004, Papadopoulos and Denktash accepted the secretary-general's invitation to resume negotiations on a settlement on the basis of the Annan plan. After meeting with Annan in New York, talks began on-island on February 19, 2004. The two community leaders met nearly every day for negotiations facilitated by the secretary-general's Special Representative for Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto. In addition, numerous technical committees and sub-committees met in parallel in an effort to resolve pending issues. When this stage of the talks failed to reach an agreeable settlement, Rauf Denktash refused to attend the next stage of meetings, which were scheduled to take place in Bürgenstock on March 24, 2004, and sent Mehmet Ali Talat, then prime minister of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and Serder Denktash, son of Rauf Denktash and then TRNC deputy prime minister and TRNC minister of foreign affairs, as his agents. The talks collapsed and the two communities did not reach any agreement. The secretary-general then stepped in as arbitrator, and on March 31 presented to the two sides a proposed final settlement. Rauf Denktash rejected Annan's proposal immediately, and Tassos Papadopoulos, the fifth president of the Republic of Cyprus, rejected the plan a week later, while Mehmet Ali Talat supported it. The plan was placed before the two communities in a simultaneous vote in the reunification referendum of April 24, 2004. Although the proposal received a 65 percent favorable vote

from the Turkish community, the Greek Cypriot community rejected it by three to one. Since implementation of the plan was dependent on its approval by both communities, reunification did not take place. Had there been a positive vote on both sides, a unified Cyprus would have acceded to the European Union on May 1, 2004; instead, Cyprus joined the EU without the northern part populated by the Turkish Cypriots. Since then, low-key talks have started again between the newly appointed UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Kieran Prendergast, and leaders of both communities; on June 16, 2005, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1604, thus renewing the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further six months, until December 15, 2005.

On October 3, 2005, membership negotiations were symbolically opened with Turkey, which has been an associate member of the EU since 1963 and an official candidate since 1999. The historic decision on December 17, 2004, by the European Council was confirmed by the European heads of state and government on June 17. On June 29, 2005, the commission presented its negotiating framework to Ankara, and after a full day of intense negotiations, the EU-25's foreign ministers finalized the document on October 3, 2005. Within hours, Turkey accepted the terms. Amid a flurry of controversy over Turkey's latest "action plan" on Cyprus, the UN announced its intention to start a new round of Cyprus peace talks in May 2006. This came about after Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for a meeting on the Cyprus conflict to be held "in May or June 2006" with the participation of representatives from Turkey, Greece, and the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Meanwhile, Kofi Annan's spokesman George Lillikas said that the UN would resume its peace efforts in Cyprus after the May 2006 parliamentary elections in the Republic of Cyprus. "Our effort is to avoid a hasty new process of negotiations, which would fail in no time," said Lillikas. In its latest "action plan" revealed on January 24, Ankara said that it would open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot carriers on the condition that they reciprocally end restrictions on Turkish Cypriots. The initiative was welcomed by the EU, the United States, and the UN, but it was immediately rejected by Greek president Papadopoulos and the Greek Cypriot leaders as a rehashing of earlier inconclusive proposals.

EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn appointed Jaakko Blomberg, former Finnish envoy to Cyprus, as EU Commission special adviser on Cyprus in June 2005. All looked set for another round of informal talks, quasi negotiations, and initiatives with uncertain outcome for all parties concerned, but with a nagging wink to the French proverb that says: "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose."

PROBLEMATIC CAUSE-AND-EFFECT TIME LINE OF CYPRUS CONFLICT

For many experts and scholars, the international conflict over Cyprus started with the attempted coup in 1974 by Greek Cypriot Sampson against then-president Makarios. Sampson's violent coup was supported by the military junta then in power in Greece with the aim of achieving *enosis* (unification of Cyprus with Greece). This attempted overthrow of the Cypriot government led subsequently to military interference by Turkey, one of the guarantor states of the newly independent Cyprus, ostensibly to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority from possible violent acts by the majority Greek communities, although the Turkish forces stationed on Northern Cyprus have yet to retreat to Turkey.[2] What remains puzzling is the inactivity of the UK, the third guarantor nation of Cyprus. Greece, being temporarily paralyzed by the collapse of the military junta and their return to democracy, was in no position to intervene militarily on the island. This was not the case for the UK, which had troops stationed on its two extraterritorial military bases. The military inactivity led to speculations as to the intention of the UK government and by extension of the United States, speculations that were recently rekindled by the release of the Callaghan report that seems to suggest that former secretary of state Henry Kissinger was intent not to intervene nor suggest intervention by the UK forces in order to not oppose Turkey's goodwill in relation to U.S. policy in the area.[3]

The ensuing war and partition of the island led to the intervention of the UN, who dispatched peace-enforcing military forces, the UNFICYP, stationed between the two sides along the so-called green line dividing the island into the Greek Cypriot controlled South and the Turkish Cypriot controlled North, with both sides' military forces being supported by Turkish and Greek army units. The largest foreign force, though, are the Turkish army units stationed on the northern part of the island since 1974. Pointing out the discrepancy between the UN force's success in keeping peace but on the other hand not being able to fulfill its mandate of "bringing a return to normal conditions," Evriviades and Bourantonis (1994) suggest that the UN peacemaking efforts were fundamentally flawed, since they led to a freezing of a status quo on the island. Some scholars attribute the cause of the 1974 violence and inability of

both sides to peacefully reunite to earlier disputes and related violence. Diana Weston Markides (2001), for instance, goes back to colonial rule by the UK and suggests that the inability of both communities and of the British administration to create functioning municipal administrations acceptable to both communities was a key factor of subsequent division of municipalities along ethnic lines, leading further to a full breakdown of cooperation between both communities at the central government level in 1963, only three years after Cyprus achieved independence from the UK. Until 1957, the main towns of Cyprus were run by councils elected on the basis of communally based proportional representation, which inevitably resulted in Greek-dominated bodies run by Greek Cypriot mayors. With independence from Britain looming and facing a power imbalance at the municipal level, some leading members of the Turkish Cypriot community requested that at the time of British withdrawal, Cyprus should be retroceded to Turkey from Britain, who had taken control of the island in 1878. The orders given to their respective Turkish Cypriot communities were to withdraw from any official participation in municipal administrations. Other scholars suggest that causes of the conflict go much further back in time, alluding, for instance, to the cruelties committed during the invasion and subsequent rule of the Ottoman empire; the various wars, sacking, and pillaging through the period of the Christian crusades; and the competition between the Venetian and Genovese forces during their colonial intrusions into the region.[4] As Alvaro de Soto, previously the UN secretary-general's Special Adviser on Cyprus, stated:

> Regrettably, as Churchill said of the Balkans, Cyprus has more history than it can digest. Trying to capture what happened in a few paragraphs is the diplomatic equivalent of walking through a minefield. For the Turkish Cypriots, the problem began in 1963 when Greek Cypriots hijacked and tried to Hellenise Cyprus, undoing the partnership enshrined in the 1960 constitution, corralling them in a small number of villages out of fear for their lives. The Greek Cypriots tend to fast-forward to 1974 and say that the problem started with the Turkish invasion and continues with its occupation. (2005)

Looking at the region from a historical point of view and reflecting on the wrangling for power over the territories of the former Ottoman empire by the UK, France, Russia, and Greece and Turkey, it is very instructive to follow in more depth the conflicting strategic interests of the big powers around the time of the Lausanne conference of 1922–23 (Goldstein, 2003). Taking this

conference as an early indicator of what was to come later in regard to the Cyprus conflict, Goldstein's article gives a picture of how third parties can decisively influence the outcome of international negotiations. Another frequently mentioned perspective is the one concerning the role of the EU. For instance, Oliver Richmond suggests that the EU expected to "act as a catalyst for the settlement of the Cyprus problem without becoming a direct mediator" (2006b:154), but by allowing Cyprus to become a member of the EU before reaching an agreement with the Turkish Cypriots, "the EU . . . had effectively become a party to the conflict" (163). Related to the above, fault has been attributed to the UN secretary-general and his team of negotiators who lost their neutrality by making use of the UN mandate to act as arbitrator when faced with no agreement after the failed Bürgenstock negotiations in 2004. By imposing a "UN solution," authors close to the Greek Cypriot position declared the UN mission of good office as a debacle (Palley, 2005). While such an observation is worthy of a longer discussion, attacking experts of the UN team as being of dubious intention reveals the suspiciousness and animosity that have always characterized the Cyprus negotiations.[5]

Finally, observations have been made about the fact that both sides of the conflict enjoy higher GDP per capita than their respective motherlands (Saner and Yiu, 2002). This could be due to the ingenuity and hard work of the two communities. It could also be due to the fact that both sides receive support from Greece and Turkey respectively and from third parties such as the UN (e.g., UNDP) and bilateral donors. Long-lasting conflicts tend to attract parallel economies (Wennmann, 2005) and result in duplication of governmental structures that in turn require additional resources of sometimes dubious origin.

PARTIES, STAKEHOLDERS, AND MEDIATORS

When mentioning the Cyprus conflict, most often allusion is made to the intercommunal conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots going back to pre-independence times, as described in the previous section. However, due to the fact that three guarantor countries (the UK, Turkey, and Greece) have the constitutional right to intervene unilaterally if seen as needed, the intercommunal conflict was immediately raised to the level of conventional war (e.g., Turkey's landing of troops on the island in 1974 leading to war with the forces of the official Cypriot government). In addition, subsequent to the conventional war

between official Cyprus and Turkey, the Security Council of the UN, following multiple resolutions passed by the UN Assembly, gave a specific mandate to the UN secretary-general and his office to create a peace-enforcing group of UN soldiers to interpose themselves between both belligerent parties (green line) and to initiate diplomatic efforts that should lead to reconciliation and reunification. From a conflict theory point of view, one could hence classify the Cyprus conflict as consisting of a bilateral conflict (Cyprus-Turkey) mediated by a third party, namely the UN secretary-general, and influenced by multiple stakeholders (e.g., two remaining guarantor countries of Greece and the UK; the EU as political supranational umbrella representing Greece and the UK; since May 2004 Cyprus [Southern Cyprus] and all the other EU member countries).

Figure 2 gives an overview of the multiple coalitions that have a direct or indirect impact on the outcome of any negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict, if one can ever be achieved at all. Third parties to the conflict can try to be constructive and help bring about a resolution of the conflict, or they might be interested in using the conflict to obtain concessions elsewhere. Several interest alliances are known to be influential in the region and linked to the Cyprus conflict. On one hand there is a configuration of countries tied to one another through various pacts and cooperation agreements ranging, for example, from cooperation in the military sector (Turkey, Israel, the United States) to alliances against a common enemy or competitor, such as Turkey and Israel together against Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq's former Saddam regime.

On the other hand, a very old alliance exists among fellow Christian orthodox countries such as Greece, Serbia, and Russia (formerly Soviet Union) against Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania, and Turkey and a strategic alliance going back to the Cold War with Syria against Turkey and later on Israel (as ally of Turkey). Another link based on common interest and years of active cooperation exists between the UK and the United States. The two bases ceded in perpetuity to the UK are used for high-tech espionage work covering the Near East, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus area. The airbase was used during the Iraq war and is intended to be at service for any other armed conflict situation. A fully reunited and harmonious Cyprus could question the legitimacy of the two bases and even ask the UK to retrocede them to the sovereign country of Cyprus.

The UN secretariat has its own concerns and tactical alliances. The Cyprus conflict has meant continuous expenditures, troop presence, and a mandate to


FIGURE 2. Complexity of influences on the Cyprus negotiations.

be a conciliator of this old conflict. Having had to face increasing criticism especially from the United States and the UK, it is perfectly understandable that the UN SG would like to see an end to the Cyprus conflict. Not to find a solution means continued expenditures that are actually needed elsewhere. Also, not being able to find a solution represents the risk of negative PR with third parties.

The alliance network depicted in figure 2 is not exhaustive. It solely serves to illustrate the complexity of the Cyprus conflict and the obvious links to other business that countries might have with one another or with other groups and where a solution or the withholding of a solution on the island could be in the best interests of these third parties but to the detriment of the concerned two communities. A classic case of such opportunistic use of conflicts is, for instance, the use of veto power by Greece to block internal EU and NATO decision-making processes. To opt for a negotiators' behavior called the "nuisance factor," third partiers can score points for their protégé (here Greek

Cyprus) as well as use their blocking power to bar entry of Turkey to the EU until Turkey, for example, makes concessions in other domains. It is unrealistic to expect a solution to the Cyprus conflict without a simultaneous package deal covering all the additional external conflicts described above. In other words, a solution to the Cyprus conflict necessitates a comprehensive solution covering the conflict but also the other stakeholders' interests.[6]

CONFLICT COMPLEXITY IN ACTION: INFLUENCE OF
THIRD PARTIES ON MALIGNANT CYPRUS CONFLICT

Cyprus has been called "the graveyard of well-intentioned mediators." Over the last nearly forty years, a multitude of peace initiatives have resulted in failure. The list of failed attempts of official and nonofficial third-party interventions is long (see Diamond and Fisher, 1995; Dodd, 1998). What follows is the list of the main causes that led to a failed Track III attempt to bring the two communities together through a so-called confidence-building project.[7] The case itself is described in detail elsewhere (Saner and Yiu, 2002).

The basic idea of the endeavor was to create joint projects in the economic sphere that would offer mutually beneficial incentives to both sides. The proposal was based on the assumption that a Swiss NGO could provide a neutral arena, in contrast to the UN auspices of the secretary-general, who was at different times seen as being biased by either of the two parties or sometimes by both for different reasons, or to a UK- or U.S.-based NGO because of their affiliation or perceived allegiance to their respective governments who were in fact actively intervening as behind-the-scenes external stakeholders. Only a new approach that had not been tried before could succeed — the involvement of both sides' economic interests in order to develop sufficient common ground for future intercommunal cooperation. What seemed possible was a nonofficial third-party intervention, which would not jeopardize the ongoing political efforts of the UN. The key to success would be to sidestep the political big picture discussions and to focus instead on the common economic interests of both communities. If the economic cooperation project succeeded, both sides would gain sufficient confidence to tackle the more complex political issues at a later stage. Switzerland was willing to extend financing for the project under conditions that the UN would welcome the project and support it, and that a second country would join the initiative.

The project did not become operational for various reasons. It could be said

that the time was not ripe for such an intercommunal project since each party involved was still trying to "win," which by definition was unacceptable to the other party. From a position of Realpolitik, one could indeed say, "Don't force cooperation if there is no will to cooperate" — in other words, the international community should allow the opponents to be separated from each other and to accept the inevitable division of Cyprus into two distinct and independent states. While this seems to be the solution preferred by many Cyprus experts, at the time of the project proposal it did not seem that all efforts had yet been tried, and that the will toward reconciliation was not yet exhausted. On the contrary, it seemed that the majority of the citizens of both communities favored reconciliation, not separation. But the main cause for the failure of this project was the multitude of interferences by third parties, who influenced the members of both communities according to their own strategic designs leading to paralysis. The paralysis came about because of the destructive impact of competition between external and internal parties and institutions who are all stakeholders to the conflict, but who at the same time could not cooperate. Their competition often led to confusion and dangerous instability, since they at times tried to manipulate the two sides' officials and populations, while at the same time they also became the victims of manipulations by either side's officials and opinion leaders.

The main forms of third party interferences were (Saner and Yiu, 2002):

- Interferences due to contradictory strategies of key external stakeholders

- Interference due to local stakeholder prerogatives

- Interference due to historical distrust of main conflicting parties

- Interferences due to the use of the "Cyprus card" for secondary gains elsewhere

- Interference due to competing agenda of institutional stakeholders (the United Nations Secretariat, the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom)

- Interferences due to bilateral tensions between Greece and Turkey

- Interferences due to competition between local leaders

- Interferences due to secondary gain of current impasse

RECENT PRESSURE TACTICS BY THIRD PARTIES TO THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

Annan V

The Annan plan for Cyprus in fact evolved over time, starting with Annan I (October 11, 2002), moving to Annan II (December 10, 2002) and on to Annan III (March 8, 2003). Annan IV was a short-lived trial version before the final Annan V (March 31, 2004) which was presented to the public a few days before the referendum took place in both communities, consisting of several thousands of pages.[8] Based on the limited access to documented texts, it appears that the UN team, in unison with the EU, U.S., and UK delegations, hoped to accommodate Denktash's objections by progressively adding concessions to the benefit of the Denktash position and to the detriment of the Greek Cypriot position. At the same time, the UN team, together with the EU Commission, the United States, and the UK, assumed that presenting the Greek Cypriot side with a last-minute complex deal a few days before the referendum and four weeks before official acceptance as EU member would be too much to reject for the Southern Cypriot leadership and people.

The opposite was the case. The negotiation behavior of the UN and the three big powers was seen as "take it or leave it" pressure on a subject that was too crucial for both communities. Too much was at stake for the Greek community to expect them to almost blindly trust that the complicated text would be in their interest. Holding a quasi monopoly in the official media, President Papadopoulos was easily able to highlight the negative aspects of the deal while downplaying the potential benefits. When under pressure and facing uncertainty, most people reject experiments they cannot control or whose implications they cannot anticipate. Adding to this uncertainty came anger when it became known that the Turkish settlers would be allowed to vote, in contrast to a comparable vote in East Timor, where Indonesian settlers were not allowed to vote during the crucial vote on independence (Evriviades, 2005:5).[9]

Ambassador Ziyal's "Final Points"

Another example of high pressure of time and demands was the list of ten points presented by Ambassador Ziyal, Turkish representative to the UN, on March 26 at the beginning of the Bürgenstock meeting, which was attended by the presidents of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus (Greek Cypriot); the UN secretary-general; U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell; and other world leaders. However, Turkish president Denktash opted to stay at home and to be replaced by Mehmet Ali Talat, then holding the function of Prime Minister of the TRNC, and his son Serdar Denktash in the role of TRNC Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Being absent from the meeting, Denktash did not have to submit to pressure nor extend any concessions. As his son's and Talat's mandate for negotiations and possible give-and-take concession making were seriously limited, there was not much hope for the Greek Cypriots to be able to trade concessions. To this one-sided situation came the sudden presentation of ten "final points" of Turkey presented by Ambassador Ziyal to the UN and addressed to the Greek Cypriot representatives. Again, the pressure of a last-minute surprise demand, similar to the Annan V "last minute proposal." The ten points consisted of the following:

1. The percentage of the Greek Cypriots returning to the North should be reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. This percentage is the least we can accept.

2. The Turkish Cypriot proposal regarding the property issue (1/3) should be accepted.

3. Bi-communal/bi-national configurations, such as that twenty-four Turkish Cypriot and twenty-four Greek Cypriot senators should be properly reflected in the plan.

4. The restriction of fifty-five years to be applied to the Turkish citizens to establish residence in Cyprus even after Turkey's accession to the EU should be lifted, since Turkish citizens would be treated as members of the EU and could hence take up residence anywhere within the EU.

5. Inclusion in the plan of the understanding of neither side claiming jurisdiction and authority over the other side.

6. Individual applications of Greek Cypriots to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) should not be encouraged. The United Cyprus Republic should be the sole responsible addressee for these cases.

7. Expectations regarding security and guarantees should be fully met.

8. Preservation of Greek and Turkish military presence on the island even after the accession of Turkey to the European Union. (The contingents provided by the Treaty of Alliance should be maintained.)

9. Measures should be developed for effective preservation of bi-zonality.

10. Turkish Cypriot citizens originating from Anatolia should not be discriminated against within the framework of a comprehensive settlement.[10]

COMPLEXITIES IN RETROSPECT

Both examples of interventions by external parties shed light on the complex situation of the Cyprus conflicts. Gaining a point, even if beneficial at first glance for the ally, here Northern Cyprus, means oftentimes scoring a point at home or signaling a message to third-, fourth-, even fifth-level parties outside the immediate Cyprus conflict "zone." Taking, for example, the tough stance of Turkey during the Bürgenstock negotiation, one can also imagine that scoring points there was equal to gaining points at home in Turkey and getting messages across to friends and enemies as well. Some of the motivations behind Turkey's tough stance might be related to the following concerns. Turkey has been working hard on making political and economic reforms required for EU membership. It passed the hurdle of being accepted as an EU candidate only in 2004. With Cyprus (Southern Cyprus) having become an EU member in May 2004, Turkey faces a situation whereby its own future EU membership application could be vetoed by Southern Cyprus, since EU membership decisions are taken by consensus. Southern Cyprus as a new EU member could hence block Turkey's EU ambitions indefinitely, an unacceptable possibility for Turkey's political and economic leadership.

At the same time, the U.S. government's antiterrorist campaign and remodeling of post-Saddam Iraq is resulting in increasing pressure on Turkey to cooperate. Such an eventuality worries Turkish leaders since the defeat of Saddam has rekindled hopes in the Kurdish-held territories of an independent Kurdish state in the northern part of Iraq. Turkish political and military leaders fear such an eventuality: an independent Kurdish state might reignite Kurdish rebellion in Turkey, and, even more worrisome, it might lead to new calls for Kurdish separation from Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey does not want to be seen as obstructing the U.S. geopolitical aims and strategies in the Middle East. Tensions are further kept high due to Southern Cyprus's continued threat to install the S-300 PMU-1 Missile System bought from Russia, which, if installed on the island, would alter the current military balance and possibly threaten Turkish airspace, including parts of Turkey inhabited by the Kurdish minority unhappy with its status and treatment by the majority Turkish government. Southern Cypriot authorities promised to withhold the installation of the missile system but not to relinquish its right to do so at a later stage. All this is, of course, not helped by recent statements of the Turkish chief of general staff Hilmi Ozkok, who declared in his new year statement of 2006 that Turkey should be "defending our rights and interests on Cyprus, which constitutes the cornerstone of our security in the Eastern Mediterranean" (Ozkok, 2006).

Among the multiple causes of this especially long-lasting deadlock are the extreme level of distrust between both parties, their constant change of positions in an often less and less cooperative way, and finally a refusal to even consider objective facts on the problem. These are as many obstacles to crack in the elusive Cyprus stalemate.

Extreme Level of Distrust

Bad faith, suspicion, and an extreme level of distrust characterize the overall situation. For instance, in March 1986, UN secretary-general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar presented the two sides with a draft framework agreement. The plan envisaged the creation of an independent, nonaligned, bi-communal, bi-zonal state in Cyprus. However, the Greek Cypriots shifted their position. They argued that the issue of the presence of Turkish forces was not addressed, nor was the repatriation of the recent Turkish settlers on the island. Finally, they pointed out that the proposed state structure was confederal in nature and as such not acceptable. De Cuéllar later blamed the failure of the talks on Denktash, because of the Turkish Cypriot leader's demand for equal sovereignty and a right to secession for the two communities.

Demonization of the other side legitimates refusals, deadlocks, and the systematic use of the "nuisance power." This built-up perception of the other entails an absolute lack of goodwill on both sides and has already worn out five UN secretary-generals.

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, when in charge, proposed eight confidence building measures (CBMs). These included reducing military forces on the island, reducing restrictions on contacts between the two sides, undertaking an islandwide census, and conducting feasibility studies regarding a solution. The Security Council endorsed the approach. Denktash accepted only some of the proposals but did not agree to the package as a whole, which was the condition for success. He stated that he was "willing to accept mutually agreed changes," which clearly meant nothing. On his side, Greek Cypriot Clerides refused to negotiate any further changes to the former proposals, which put an end to any possibility of moving on (Migdalovitz, 2005).

Close to two hundred thousand Greek Cypriot refugees have been isolated from their homes by the Turkish control of the northern sector of the island. The issue of the restitution of their property has been a fundamental claim of the Greek Cypriot side. However, the Turkish Cypriots argue that the complete return of all Greek Cypriot properties to their original owners would be incompatible with the functioning of a bi-zonal, bicommunal federal settlement, again leading the whole negotiation process to a dead end. UN special adviser Alexander Downer raised the question to the two sides to make clear whether they wanted a solution or not. "The parties have exhausted all their arguments and counter-arguments," he added. "What is missing now is the political will." In March 2011, UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon reported, "The negotiations cannot be an open-ended process, nor can we afford interminable talks for the sake of talks" (Kambas, 2011).

Unstable Positions

Shifts in positions that are often inexplicable have made all solutions less and less credible. Initially the two sides strongly disagreed on the concept of "bicommunality." The Turkish Cypriots considered that their state should be exclusively Turkish Cypriot and that the Greek Cypriot state should be exclusively Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots contended that the two states should be predominantly, but not exclusively, made up of a particular community. Later, the Greek side changed position on its understanding of bicommunality, and this attitude raised more suspicion than satisfaction on the Turkish side.

In December 1993, Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides proposed the demilitarization of Cyprus. Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, dismissed the idea, but the next month he announced that he would be willing to accept the CBMs "in principle." These CBMs included the gradual demilitarization of the island. Then, Clerides said that he would be willing to accept the document if the Turkish Cypriot did. Then, Denktash refused, arguing that it would upset the balance of forces on the island.

Furthermore, Denktash announced that he would no longer accept federation as a basis for a settlement. In the future he would only be prepared to negotiate on the basis of a confederal solution. His successor, newly elected Northern Cyprus prime minister Mehmet Ali Talat, accepted the bizonal bicommunity federation in final UN-led negotiations in 2003, only to have the Annan plan rejected by the Greek Cypriots in the April 24, 2004, referendum. Such a continuous dance leaves all mediators and observers wondering what can be taken seriously in these ever-changing positions. No solid and reliable base for building up a sustainable agreement has been established. What is at stake is nothing less than the credibility of all statements.

Denial of Objective Facts

In December 1996, the European Court of Human Rights delivered a ruling that affirmed that Turkey was an occupying power in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots did not accept the sentence, arguing that the court was politically biased. Another important problem is that the Greek Cypriot side has asked that the UN or another international organization organize, supervise, and execute a simultaneous census on the whole island. The Turkish Cypriots rejected this demand. It is a major problem if there is already a disagreement on objective facts or on attempts to collect objective data, for durable agreements have to be built from realities.

CONCLUSION

The objective of this chapter has been to shed light on the impact of external stakeholders' interferences on a protracted conflict, in this case the Cyprus conflict. We contend that the impact of persistent interference by external stakeholders is a topic that has not received sufficient exposure in the conflict literature. The objective here was hence to illustrate such third-party interference in the case of the long-lasting Cyprus conflict and to describe the diverse forms of interference used by the third parties and how these multiple

interferences have turned the Cyprus conflict into a malignant, seemingly intractable conflict as long as third-party interests remain high and secondary gains too important to maintain for other purposes elsewhere.

NOTES

1. Public domain U.S. State Department background note on Cyprus, April 2004.

2. Both sides describe this situation differently, namely as an "intervention" by Northern Cyprus and Turkey based on the legal argument that Turkey had a unilateral right and obligation based on the 1960 constitution, and as an "invasion" by Southern Cyprus and Greece based on the argument that Turkey has violated international law by not having withdrawn its forces from Cyprus, and frequently making comparisons between the Cyprus conflict and, for instance, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces.

3. Reference is made here to the release by James Callaghan, former UK secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, which supposedly has been released for publication according to the thirty years rule (see http://www.cyprusembassy.net, February 20, 2006).

4. For an insightful analysis of conscious and unconscious motivations of members of both conflict parties, see Volkan (1979).

5. Palley, for instance, insinuates the partiality of Didier Pfirter, Swiss delegate to De Soto's team, by mentioning that he has studied philosophy and Islamic studies (Palley, 2005:19).

6. Yesilada and Sozen (2002), for instance, offer a very well argued analysis of the Cyprus conflict based on game theory and the prisoner dilemma concept. While such game's theoretical perspective offers interesting insights, it is also insufficient since it reduces real complexity of multistakeholder interferences to a purely bilateral conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

7. For clarification, Track I refers to government, Track II to nongovernment/professional, and Track III to business or peacemaking through commerce.

8. For detailed analysis of how the four Annan proposals evolved over time, see Palley (2005:275–314).

9. For many scholars following the Cyprus conflict, it was a surprise that the EU would allow membership of a country that did not have full control of its territory. It was, however, often insinuated that without Cyprus being given EU membership status Greece would not have agreed to NATO enlargement.

10. Palley (2005:19, 128–29) describes how many of the points were accommodated by the UN team as reported from a pro–Greek Cypriot perspective.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

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